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10 Years ‘Equator Principles’: A Critical Economic-Ethical Analysis 
Manuel Wörsdörfer1  
Abstract:  
June 4th, 2013 marks the formal launch of the third generation of the Equator Principles (EP III) and the tenth 
anniversary of the EPs – enough reasons for evaluating the EPs initiative from an economic ethics and business 
ethics perspectives. In particular, this essay deals with the following questions: What are the EPs and where are 
they going? What has been achieved so far by the EPs? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the EPs? 
Which necessary reform steps need to be adopted in order to further strengthen the EPs framework? Can the EPs 
be regarded as a role-model in the field of sustainable finance and CSR? The paper is structured as follows: The 
first chapter defines the term EPs and introduces the keywords related to the EPs framework. The second chapter 
gives a brief overview of the history of the EPs. The third chapter discusses the Equator Principles Association, 
the governing, administering, and managing institution behind the EPs. The fourth chapter summarizes the main 
features and characteristics of the newly released third generation of the EPs. The fifth chapter critically 
evaluates the EP III from an economic ethics and business ethics perspectives. The paper concludes with a 
summary of the main findings. 
Keywords: Equator Principles, Equator Principles Association, project finance, reputational risk, corporate 
social responsibility, sustainable finance, multinational companies/business and human rights.  
A. Introductory Remarks 
On June 4th 2013, the Equator Principles Association celebrated the formal launch of the third 
generation of the Equator Principles (EP III) and at the same time the tenth anniversary of the 
Equator Principles – enough reasons for evaluating the Equator Principles initiative from an 
economic ethics and business ethics perspectives. 
In particular, this essay deals with the following questions: What are the Equator Principles 
and where are they going? What has been achieved so far by the Equator Principles 
(Association)? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Equator Principles? Which 
necessary reform steps need to be adopted in order to further strengthen the Equator 
Principles framework? Can the Principles be regarded as a role-model in the field of 
sustainable finance and CSR? 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The first chapter defines the term Equator 
Principles and introduces the keywords related to the Equator Principles framework. The 
second chapter gives a brief overview of the history of the Equator Principles. The third 
chapter discusses the Equator Principles Association, the governing, administering, and 
managing institution behind the Equator Principles. The fourth chapter summarizes the main 
features and characteristics of the newly released third generation of the Equator Principles. 
The fifth chapter critically evaluates the EP III from an economic ethics and business ethics 
perspectives. The paper concludes with a summary of my main findings. 
1 Address for correspondence: Manuel Wörsdörfer, Postdoctoral Research Fellow (Cluster of Excellence ‘The 
Formation of Normative Orders’) and Visiting Scholar (Critical Research Laboratory in Law & Society, 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University). Postal address: Goethe University Frankfurt, Grueneburgplatz 1, 
60323 Frankfurt am Main/Germany; Phone: +49 (0)69-798-34782; Fax: +49 (0)69-798-35015; E-mail: 
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B. General Overview 
The Equator Principles2 aim at environmental protection (i.e., the protection of project-
affected ecosystems) as well as the promotion of environmental and social stewardship, and 
corporate environmental and social responsibility (CESR) – including human rights. An 
illustrative list of potential environmental and social issues tackled by the Equator Principles 
include the protection and conservation of biodiversity (i.e., endangered species, sensitive 
ecosystems/critical habitats); sustainable resource management and use of renewable natural 
resources; management and use of dangerous substances/chemical waste management; 
efficient production, delivery and use of energy; pollution prevention and waste minimization; 
respect (protection and realization) of human rights (i.e., prevent, mitigate and manage 
adverse human rights impacts); labor issues and occupational health and safety; participation 
and consultation of project-affected stakeholders in the design, review and implementation of 
the project; socio-economic impacts; impacts on project-affected communities, and 
disadvantaged or vulnerable groups; gender impacts; land acquisition and involuntary 
resettlement; impacts on indigenous peoples, and their unique cultural systems and values; 
protection of cultural property and heritage.3 
The Equator Principles are officially described as a voluntary and self-regulatory finance 
industry benchmark in project finance. In particular, they are a finance industry standard for 
environmental and social risk management or as it is often referred to a “credit risk 
management framework for determining, assessing, and managing environmental and social 
risk in Project Finance transactions”4 (Equator Principles Website). The Equator Principles 
Association refers to the Principles as the “gold standard”5 and good practice in 
environmental and social risk management for project finance.  
They impose obligations on both lenders (Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFI)) 
and borrowers (clients) with regard to environmental and social impact assessment, public 
participation and stakeholder engagement, risk management, compliance, enforcement, and 
monitoring. E.g., lenders are held accountable to implement responsible and sustainable 
2 Cp. for a general overview: Silvina S. Gonzales Napolitano, Equator Principles, in Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law (2011), available at:
www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-
e1038&recno=48&letter=E (accessed 11 July 2013). 
3 Cp. Equator Principles Association, The Equator Principles (EP III), 20 (2013), available at: http://equator-
principles.com/index.php/ep3/ep3  (accessed 11 November 2013).   
4 Cp. Equator Principles Association, Equator Principles Website (2013), available at: www.equator-
principles.com/ (accessed 31 October 2013). 
5 Suellen Lazarus & Alan Feldbaum, Equator Principles Strategic Review. Final Report, i (2011), available at: 




lending practices. They are held liable for negative social and environmental externalities of 
their clients. While the participating EPFIs have adopted the Equator Principles and help 
enforcing and monitoring them, it is in fact the client or borrower that is expected to fulfill 
and adhere to the requirements laid down by the Equator Principles. These obligations are 
imposed by the lender upon the borrower and they get formalized as covenants which are part 
of the loan documentation or investment agreement between the financial institution and the 
project developer (cp. Principle 8 of the Equator Principles on Covenants).   
The term ‘Equator’ represents the balance between ‘developed’ countries, ‘developing 
countries’ and emerging markets, a balance between the southern and the northern 
hemisphere, between East and West. Furthermore, the Equator Principles apply globally on 
both sides of the Equator. The third generation of the Equator Principles (EP III) applies to 
four financial products, namely project finance, advisory services related to project finance, 
project-related corporate loans, and bridge loans. They apply where total project capital costs 
exceed US$ 10 million. They are adopted by so called EPFIs, financial institutions which are 
active in project-finance or project-related advisory services.  
The Equator Principles are based on the Performance Standards on Social and Environmental 
Sustainability6 of the International Finance Corporation7 (i.e., the private sector lending arm 
of the World Bank Group) as well as on the World Bank Group Environmental, Health, and 
Safety Guidelines (EHS Guidelines8). Typically, a revision of the IFC Performance Standards 
                                                          
6 The IFC Performance Standards include the following guidelines: Assessment and Management of 
Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts; Labor and Working Conditions; Resource Efficiency and Pollution 
Prevention; Community Health, Safety and Security; Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement; 
Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources; Indigenous Peoples; and 
Cultural Heritage (cp. International Finance Corporation, Performance Standards on Environmental and Social 
Sustainability (2012), available at: 
www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/IFC+Sustainability/Sustaina
bility+Framework/Sustainability+Framework+-+2012/Performance+Standards+and+Guidance+Notes+2012/  
(accessed 11 July 2013); see also Michael Torrance (ed.), IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and 
Social Sustainability. A Guidebook (2012). 
7 The IFC, established in 1956, is a public financial institution affiliated with the World Bank Group. It is a 
separate legal entity with its own operational mandate, professional staff and financial resources. Its main aim is 
to encourage private sector growth and investment in developing countries and emerging markets. In fact, the 
IFC is one of the largest providers of multilateral finance in these countries. Its activities supplement the work of 
the World Bank Group that exclusively lends to member state governments. It has a commercial orientation and 
its loan syndications program includes private multinational banks. The IFC functions as a meeting facilitator 
and technical advisor. In this respect, the IFC is well-known for its expertise in environmental and social risk 
management. It has formed partnerships with the UN Global Compact and the United Nations Environment 
Program Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI). As such, the IFC is often regarded as a de facto standard-setter in the 
finance industry sector. E.g., the Equator Principles use the IFC’s environmental and social safeguard policy 
framework as a blueprint (cp. Christopher Wright, Setting Standards for Responsible Banking: Examining the 
Role of the International Finance Corporation in the Emergence of the Equator Principles, in International 
Organizations and Global Environmental Governance, 51, 52 (F. Biermann, B. Siebenhuener, A. Schreyrogg 
eds., 2009); cp. Torrance (note 6). 
8 The EHS Guidelines are technical reference documents containing examples of good international industry 
practices. Two sets of guidelines are important: the General Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines 
4 
 
precedes a revision of the Equator Principles. The EPFIs commit themselves to not providing 
loans and credits to projects where the borrower is not or is unable to comply with the 
respective social and environmental standards and guidelines. 
Currently, 78 financial institutions from 35 countries and six continents (as of November 
2013) adopted the Equator Principles. According to official data provided by the Equator 
Principles Association, the Equator Principles cover over 70% of international project finance 
debt in emerging markets.9 
I. The Special Role of Project Finance10 
As mentioned before, the Equator Principles apply globally to four financial products, namely 
project finance, advisory services related to project finance, project-related corporate loans, 
and bridge loans. The project finance (PF) sector itself funds the design, construction and 
operation of large industrial and infrastructure projects especially in emerging markets and 
developing countries. Examples include power plants, chemical processing plants, 
manufacturing plants, (gold, silver, copper, etc.) mines, oil and gas projects as well as 
transportation and telecommunication infrastructures (e.g., bridges, dams and pipelines). 
These large infrastructures and industrial projects can have a substantially large ecological 
and social footprint (i.e., impact on natural/ecological resources and local communities). They 
are technically complex, capital-intensive and involve significant financial and non-financial 
risks. They are usually conducted by short-term joint ventures most often in the form of 
special purpose vehicles (SPV). Moreover, these kinds of projects are typically financed 
jointly by syndicates that involve several financial institutions. The reason is that significant 
financial and non-financial risks are involved, i.e., the failure of a project may result in a near-
complete loss of investments. Sources of risk include the following: market and/or financial 
risks (i.e., interest rate risk, credit risk, off-balance-sheet risk, foreign exchange risk/risk of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(which contain information and data on cross-cutting environmental, health, and safety issues applicable to all 
industry sectors; they are divided into sections entitled: Environmental; Occupational Health and Safety; 
Community Health and Safety; Construction; and Decommissioning) and the Industry Sector Guidelines, 
containing sector-specific recommendations (cp. International Finance Corporation/World Bank Group, 
Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines (2007), available at: 
www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/554e8d80488658e4b76af76a6515bb18/Final%2B-
%2BGeneral%2BEHS%2BGuidelines.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (accessed 11 July 2013)).   
9 Cp. Equator Principles Association (note 3). 
10 Cp. Christopher Wright & Alexis Rwabizambuga, Institutional Pressure, Corporate Reputation, and Voluntary 
Codes of Conduct: An Examination of the Equator Principles, 111 Business and Society Review, 89, 96 (2006); 
Stefanie Kleimeier & Roald Versteeg, Project Finance as a driver of economic growth in low-income countries, 
19 Review of Financial Economics, 49 (2010); Patrick Haack, Dennis Schoeneborn & Christopher Wickert, 
Exploring the Constitutive Conditions for a Self-Energizing Effect of CSR Standards: The Case of the “Equator 
Principles”, 115 Working Paper Series Institute of Organization and Administrative Science University of 
Zurich, 17 (2010); Marissa Marco, Accountability in International Project Finance: The Equator Principles and 
the Creation of Third-Party-Beneficiary Status for Project-Affected Communities, 34 Fordham International Law 
Journal, 452, 456 (2011).  
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currency devaluation, liquidity risk, insolvency risk, operational risk), political risks (i.e., risk 
of political interference and confiscation, expropriation risks, risk of governmental 
nationalization, political turmoil, civil unrest/civil war), environmental and social risks (i.e., 
financial institution’s direct liability for environmental and social damage caused by its 
borrowing clients), and last not least, reputational risk (i.e., risks to the bank’s reputation and 
negative publicity from environmental, social and corporate governance issues11).12  
Typically, the lender’s loan is secured by the different project assets and repaid mainly from 
the cash flows of the project and the value of the facilities themselves. What makes the project 
finance sector so attractive is the fact that it is a (potentially) high margin business with large 
revenue streams (given that the project runs successfully).13  
The market itself is shaped by a few market players. The major lenders in project finance are 
the World Bank Group (and in particular the IFC), export credit agencies, development banks 
and large private commercial banks. Noteworthy is also the fact that project finance is only a 
small segment of major financial institutions. It commonly accounts for up to 5% of the 
overall turnover of financial institutions. As such, the Equator Principles apply only to a small 
fraction of multinational bank’s total activities.14  
Project finance is often regarded as a substitute for a lack of local or regional financial and 
institutional development. Project finance as a complement for foreign direct investments can 
compensate for a lack of managerial capabilities and poor political and corporate governance. 
The public sector in developing countries is most often not capable to design, construct and 
operate such complex projects due to its inefficiencies and lack of management know-how. 
Project finance, thus, transfers the development, construction and management to the private 
sector and its superior expertise. In addition, project finance stimulates economic growth: 
Newly acquired telecommunication and transportation infrastructures can lead to improved 
economic growth in developing countries and emerging markets – so called “finance-growth 
                                                          
11 Non-CSR behavior can backfire in the sense that it might cause media-driven scandalization which directly 
affects the reputational capital and stock market value of a company. If the project developer (client) performs in 
a socially and environmentally irresponsible manner, it may cause legal and other financial costs and reduce 
revenues due to NGO pressure and reputational damage. Reputational capital has direct impacts on financial 
institutions’ ability to generate future revenue. Adopting and implementing CESR guidelines and ‘voluntary’ 
codes of conduct (being part of the (reputation) risk management), therefore, provides defense against potential 
customer boycott and NGO criticism. CESR is also beneficial since it enhances the bank’s reputation (cp. 
Richard Macve & Xiaoli Chen, The “equator principles”: a success for voluntary codes?, 23 Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 890, 894 (2010). 
12 Cp. Marcel Jeucken, Sustainable Finance and Banking: The Financial Sector and the Future of the Planet, 118 
(2001/2002); Bede O.N. Nwete, The Equator Principles: How far will it affect Project Financing?, 2 
International Business Law Journal, 173 (2005); Andrian Lozinski, The Equator Principles: Evaluating the 
Exposure of Commercial Lenders to Socio-Environmental Risk, 13 German Law Journal, 1487 (2012). 
13 Especially, projects that circumvent environmental and social standards cause the most adverse environmental 
and social impacts; yet, they also happen to generate the most (corporate) revenue – at least in the short run. 
14 Cp. Haack et al. (note 10), 17.  
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nexus”.15 With its growth-enhancing properties, project finance might be regarded as a main 
driver of economic growth in low-income countries and emerging markets.16 
C. A Brief History of the Equator Principles 
In October 2002, the first meeting of the later ‘Equator banks’ was convened in London 
together with the IFC to discuss environmental and social risk topics in the project finance 
sector. This meeting was triggered by the growing reputational pressure17 18 from NGOs such 
as BankTrack19, Bankwatch, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch, 
International Rivers Network, Rainforest Action Network, and World Wide Fund for Nature. 
In fact, NGO criticism and activism have played huge (catalyzing) roles in developing and 
adopting the Equator Principles.20 NGOs, civil society organizations, and other stakeholder 
                                                          
15 Cp. Kleimeier & Versteeg (note 10). 
16 Project finance is often undertaken as part of a national growth strategy. “It remains particularly popular in 
emerging markets:  in the aftermath of the financial crisis, India developed a $475 billion infrastructure stimulus 
plan and Brazil has plans to build 24 dams in the Amazon this decade at a cost of roughly $100 billion (the 
nation already gets 80% of its power from dams but wants to boost its capacity by 60% by 2019 to keep-up with 
its economy)” (Ariel Meyerstein, Global Private Regulation in Development Finance: The Equator Principles 
and the Transnationalization of Public Contracting, in The Internationalization of Public Contracts, 9 (Mathias 
Audit & Stephan Schill eds., forthcoming in 2013). The need for project finance and in particular infrastructure 
projects stems also from the fact that developing countries have to meet population growth needs and, thus, 
increasing energy and food supply needs.   
17 Given the persistent NGO pressure, it seems at odds to describe the Equator Principles as a ‘voluntary’ code of 
conduct. They are mostly adopted due to external pressure (i.e., demands from local communities, customers, 
socially responsible investment groups, etc.). What makes them ‘voluntary’ is the fact that the adoption is not 
formally obliged by the regulatory authorities; a threat of mandatory legal regulation is lacking. 
18 Especially Western European and North-American multinational financial institutions face strong reputational 
pressure to become ‘green’ and behave socially responsible. Scholtens/Dam found out that institutions that adopt 
the Equator Principles are significantly larger than those that do not. The reason is that reputation appears to be 
more important for large institutions since they experience more pressure from NGOs. CSR issues are, thus, 
essential for large, multinational banks in the spotlight (cp. Bert Scholtens & Lammertjan Dam, Banking on the 
Equator. Are Banks that Adopted the Equator Principles Different from Non-Adopters, 35 World Development, 
1307 (2007); see also Parashar Kulkarni, Pushing Lenders to Over-Comply with Environmental Regulations: A 
Developing Country Perspective, 22 Journal of International Development, 470, 475 (2010).  
19 BankTrack is a worldwide operating network and consortium of various NGOs and civil society organizations. 
It functions as a watchdog of the activities of global financial institutions and their impact on people and the 
planet. It has played an important role in reviewing and updating the Equator Principles as well as in channeling 
civil society pressure on the EPFIs. 
20 Almost all of the founding members of the Equator Principles have been targeted in one way or the other by 
NGO activism/criticism and civil society organizations’ advocacy campaigns (especially ABN AMRO, Barclays, 
Citigroup and WestLB). Prominent examples causing public outcry include the Three Gorges Dam project on 
the Yangtze Rivers in the Peoples Republic of China, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project, the Sakhalin 
II oil and gas project in Russia, the Orion Paper-Pulp Mill case in Uruguay, and the Belo Monte Dam in the 
Brazilian Amazon. Current controversies include e.g., fracking and tar/oil sands mining in Canada (which has 
potential negative impacts on the Canadian ecosystem and on climate change), the Bristol Bay controversy in 
Alaska (salmon fisheries and indigenous peoples vs. copper and gold mining companies), the Keystone oil 
pipeline from Alberta/Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, the Marlin mining project in Guatemala (involving the 
Canadian mining company Glamis Gold/Goldcorp), the Fenix mining project in Guatemala (involving the 
Canadian mining company Skye Resources/HudBay Minerals), and the Pascua Lama mining project in 
Argentina and Chile (involving the Toronto-based mining company Barrick Gold; it is noteworthy that two 
Equator Banks, Ex-Im Bank and Export Development Canada (EDC), decided to not finance the project due to 
clear violations of the Equator Principles (including serious human rights violations committed on the Diaguita 
Indigenous community) (cp. Andrew Hardenbrook, The Equator Principles: The Private Financial Sector's 
Attempt at Environmental Responsibility, 40 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 197, 215 (2007); Shin 
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groups function as watchdogs and “counter accountants”.21 They monitor the ethical, social 
and environmental commitments and business activities of financial institutions and challenge 
the moral legitimacy of their practices.22 They hold financial institutions “accountable for 
perceived deficiencies in recognizing and reporting credibly on their social and environmental 
responsibilities”.23 In case of apparent non-compliance (i.e., adverse environmental, social and 
human rights impacts/violations and other forms of corporate governance scandals), NGOs 
might start public ‘naming and shaming’ campaigns, customer boycotts and civil 
disobedience protest movements. These protests often catch media attention and as a 
consequence might cause negative publicity and negative reputational effects for the involved 
EPFIs and their clients: “Public scrutiny of bank activity can be extremely detrimental to a bank’s 
reputation, leading to a devaluation of a bank’s brand and potentially a decrease in the stock price24. 
To avoid the negative publicity, private banks began to incorporate into their financial agreements 
environmental standards that go above and beyond the standards of the country where the project is 
being constructed”.25  
In January 2003, the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions and Sustainability26 
was launched at the World Economic Forum in Davos/Switzerland. Its aim was to coordinate 
NGO finance sector campaigning. The declaration laid the foundation of the NGO BankTrack 
and was endorsed by more than 100 civil society organizations. In the centre of the 
declaration are the following six principles:  
• Commitment to Sustainability (“FIs must expand their missions from ones that prioritize 
profit maximization to a vision of social and environmental sustainability. […] integrate the 
consideration of ecological limits, social equity and economic justice into corporate strategies 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Imai, Ladan Mehranvar & Jennifer Sander, Breaching Indigenous Law: Canadian Mining in Guatemala, 6 
Indigenous Law Journal, 101 (2007); Shin Imai, Bernadette Maheandiran & Valerie Crystal, Accountability 
Across Borders: Mining in Guatemala and the Canadian Justice System, 26 Osgoode CLPE Research Paper 
(2012), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2143679 (accessed 31 July 2013); 
Vivian Lee, Enforcing the Equator Principles: An NGO’s Principled Effort to Stop the Financing of a Paper Pulp 
Mill in Uruguay, 6 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, 354 (2008); Christopher Wright, Global 
Banks, the Environment, and Human Rights: The Impact of the Equator Principles on Lending Policies and 
Practices, 12 Global Environmental Politics, 56, 65 (2012); Meyerstein (note 16).  
21 Niamh O’Sullivan & Brendan O’Dwyer, Stakeholder perspectives on a financial sector legitimation process. 
The case of NGOs and the Equator Principles, 22 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 553 (2009). 
22 Due to the great visibility of most of the financed projects within project finance, environmental and ethical 
malpractices are highly exposed to external stakeholder pressure which might cause reputational damage for the 
companies involved (cp. Wright/Rwabizambuga (note 10), 109). 
23 O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer (note 21), 558. 
24 Empirical research has shown that environmental, social and corporate governance issues positively affect 
long-term shareholder value pointing towards a link between environmental, social and financial performance 
(cp. Kulkarni (note 18), 474). 
25 Hardenbrook (note 20), 206. 
26 Cp. Andreas Missbach, The Equator Principles: Drawing the line for socially responsible banks? An interim 
review from an NGO perspective, 47 Development, 78, 81 (2004); Benjamin Richardson, The Equator 
Principles: The Voluntary Approach to Environmentally Sustainable Finance, 11 European Environmental Law 
Review, 280, 288 (2005); Wright (note 7), 8; O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer (note 21), 563. 
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and core business areas […], to put sustainability objectives on an equal footing to shareholder 
maximization…”),  
• Commitment to ‘Do not harm’ (“FIs should commit to do no harm by preventing and minimizing 
the environmentally and/or socially detrimental impacts of their portfolios and their operations. FIs 
should create policies, procedures and standards based on the Precautionary Principle to minimize 
environmental and social harm”),  
• Commitment to Responsibility (“FIs should bear full responsibility for the environmental and 
social impacts of their transactions” including the “social and environmental costs that are borne by 
communities”),  
• Commitment to Accountability (FIs must be accountable to their stakeholders, particularly those 
that are affected by the companies and activities they finance”),  
• Commitment to Transparency (“FIs must be transparent to stakeholders, not only through robust, 
regular and standardized disclosure, but also by being responsive to stakeholder needs for specialized 
information on FIs’ policies, procedures and transactions. Commercial confidentiality should not be 
used as an excuse to deny stakeholders information”), and  
• Commitment to Sustainable Markets and Governance (“FIs should ensure that markets are 
more capable of fostering sustainability by actively supporting public policy, regulatory and/or market 
mechanisms…”).27  
The Collevecchio Declaration had a tremendous impact on the Equator Principles and 
accelerated the dynamic interaction process between EPFIs, NGOs, civil society organizations 
and other stakeholder groups.  
On June 4th 2003, the first generation of the Equator Principles (EP I) was launched and 
adopted by the first ten financial institutions.28 Among the founding members were ABN 
AMRO, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Lyonnais, Credit Suisse, HVB, Rabobank, Royal Bank of 
Scotland, WestLB, and Westpac. Beginning of 2006, the first strategic review and update 
process took place. Several NGOs, civil society organizations, export credit agencies, industry 
associations, etc. participated in this first engagement and review process. The aim was to 
revise the Equator Principles and to incorporate the various changes in the IFC Performance 
Standards which came into effect in April 2006. A couple of months later, on July 6th 2006, 
the second generation of Equator Principles (EP II) was launched. Key changes (EP I vs. EP 
II) include the lowering of the financial threshold from US$ 50 million to US$ 10 million, the 
                                                          
27 Collevecchio Declaration, The role and responsibility of financial institutions (2003), available at: 
www.banktrack.org/download/collevechio_declaration/030401_collevecchio_declaration_with_signatories.pdf 
(accessed 11 July 2013).   
28 In the last ten years, the Equator Principles have seen a rapid and widespread adoption rate, both in terms of 
quantity and diversification. Almost all important banks that are currently engaged in project finance have 
adopted the Equator Principles, including Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Royal Bank of 
Scotland, ING, among others (cp. for more information about the Equator Principles ‘diffusion process’: Haack 
et al. (note 10)).   
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extension of scope (i.e., inclusion of project-related advisory services: the Equator Principles 
are now applied at an earlier stage, namely the advisory stage of project planning), the 
inclusion of stronger environmental and social standards as outlined in the IFC Performance 
Standards (i.e., environmental plus(!) social assessment; enhanced consultation (i.e., prior 
informed consultation, yet not consent!) and covenanting requirements; labor standards; 
project-level grievance mechanism), increased transparency by requiring each EPFI to report 
publicly on its Equator Principles implementation on an annual basis (cp. the newly added 
Principle 10).  
In April 2008, the Equator Principles Secretariat got established followed by the formal 
establishment of the Equator Principles Association and the launch of the Governance Rules 
in July 2010.29 Both steps contributed immensely to the (enhanced) formalization and 
institutionalization of the Equator Principles and its public visibility. From October 2010 until 
May 2011, the Equator Principles Association launched a Strategic Review Process followed 
by an official Update Process starting in July 2011. This update and review process reflected 
ongoing learning, implementation experience and emerging good practices. Moreover, the 
process reflected the changing financial landscape as well as the changing public perception 
of the role of financial institutions. The financial crisis of 2007/2008 had contributed to a 
legitimacy crisis and a loss of public trust in finance industry institutions. Key thematic areas 
during the second update and review process were the extension of scope of the Equator 
Principles, as well as reporting, transparency, and governance issues including stakeholder 
engagement, climate change/global warming, and human rights. In the first phase, an internal 
consultation process yielded a first draft of EP III. The second phase, the stakeholder 
consultation and public comment period, gave stakeholder groups the chance to comment on 
the initial draft and make suggestions for further improvement (although not all 
recommendations were taken into account by the Equator Principles Association and included 
in the final draft). In the third phase, the third generation of the Equator Principles was 
finalized and launched taking into considerations the newly revised IFC Performance 
Standards which came into effect on January 1st 2012. June 4th 2013 marks the formal Launch 
of EP III as well as the tenth anniversary of the Equator Principles. Until the end of 2013, a 
transition period applies to give EPFIs as well as clients the chance to implement EP III for all 
products in the newly extended scope. From January 1st 2014, EP III will be applied to all new 
transactions. 
                                                          
29 Cp. Equator Principles Association, Governance Rules (2010), available at: www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/about/governance-and-management (accessed 11 November 2013).  
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With the introduction of EP III the scope of the Equator Principles will be extended to cover 
not only project finance and project-related advisory services, but also project-related 
corporate loans and bridge loans; i.e., more projects will be assessed under a strengthened and 
broadened environmental and social risk management framework. EP III also aims at a 
greater consistency in the implementation of the Equator Principles and an enhanced 
transparency through extended reporting requirements.  
Even more important fact is that the EP III framework takes into account climate 
change/global warming, human rights and stakeholder engagement issues (although major 
deficiencies still exist, of which more later). With regards to climate change and global 
warming, EP III requires an Alternative Analysis for high CO2 emitting projects.30 Projects 
emitting more than 100,000 tons CO2 equivalent should consider alternative technologies and 
procedures requiring less carbon intensive fuel or energy sources. These resource-saving 
technologies have to be technically and financially feasible and cost-effective. The overall 
aim of the Equator Principles is to reduce project-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
during the design, construction and operation phases of the particular projects. The 
Alternative Analysis should include a comparison to other viable and feasible technologies 
and procedures used in the same country, region, or industry sector. High carbon intensity 
sectors include thermal power, cement and lime manufacturing, steel mills, metal smelting 
and refining, and foundries. Moreover, borrowers have to report publicly on GHG 
emissions.31 With regard to stakeholder engagement and human rights issues, EP III 
introduces the term human rights in the Equator Principles framework for the first time. EP III 
also acknowledges John Ruggie’s ‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy’ Framework, the United 
Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the importance of human rights in the due diligence 
process. Finally, the current Consultation and Disclosure procedure is extended by the 
Stakeholder Engagement process requiring ‘informed consultation and participation’ (ICP) as 
                                                          
30 EP III focuses (solely) on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, while other greenhouse gases such as methane 
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), ozone (O3) and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) are mainly neglected. In addition, EP III 
concentrates on fossil fuel burning, while other sources of the greenhouse effect such as deforestation only play a 
minor role.  
New technologies such as fracking, oil/tar sands or deepwater drilling raise complex environmental issues such 
as groundwater contamination, depletion of water reserves, methane leakage, contamination from spills, and 
related health effects. The question that comes up in light of these new technologies is whether EP III is readily 
equipped to deal with these new technological challenges (which at least partially threaten the overall goal to 
fight climate change/global warming due to their partial increase in GHG emissions). EP III as well as the IFC 
Performance Standards and EHS Guidelines provide only limited guidance related to these new technologies. 
Furthermore, even in Western Europe, the United States and Canada, inadequate environmental regulation exists 
in terms of these new technologies (cp. Suellen Lazarus, The Equator Principles at Ten Years, Transnational 
Legal Theory (forthcoming in 2014)). 
31  Cp. Equator Principles Association (note 5), 12. 
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well as ‘free, prior and informed consent’ (FPIC) – given that indigenous peoples are 
involved.32   
D. The Equator Principles Association – Governance and Management 
The Equator Principles Association is the unincorporated association of EPFIs. Its objective is 
the management, administration and further development of the Equator Principles. The 
association got established on July 1st 2010. It is governed by a set of Governance Rules 
which are accessible on the website of the Equator Principles Association. Two governance 
levels have to be distinguished: the administration and the management levels. The 
management level consists of the Steering Committee which is responsible for the 
coordination of the administration, management and further advancement of the Equator 
Principles on behalf of EPFIs. The Steering Committee can set up permanent or temporary 
working groups fostering the inclusion of stakeholder groups. One of the main tasks of these 
working groups is to discuss governance and implementation issues and provide guidance to 
EPFIs with regards to further advancement of the Equator Principles. Currently, 10 working 
groups exist, e.g., on stakeholder engagement (NGOs and civil society organizations), 
biodiversity, climate change, social risks, sustainability issues, etc.  
As of November 2013, 14 members are part of the Steering Committee which makes 
consensus-building an increasingly difficult task. EPFIs become members of the Steering 
Committee on the basis of a rotation principle for a maximum of three years. Among the 
members of the Steering Committee, one EPFI is elected as Chair of the Steering Committee 
who functions as the speaker and provides coordination across the Steering Committee, the 
other member of the institutions, and the working groups. Members of the Steering 
Committee hold the chair for a term of approximately one year (with the maximum of two 
consecutive terms) on the basis of a rotation principle as well. Currently, Leonie Schreve, 
Director and Head of Sustainable Lending at ING, holds the Chair of the Equator Principles 
Association.  
The second level of the Equator Principles Association is the administration level consisting 
of the Equator Principles Secretariat. The Secretariat manages the every-day running of the 
Equator Principles Association. In particular, the Secretariat is responsible for the Equator 
                                                          
32 “’Consultation’ in this context should be ‘free’ (free of external manipulation, interference or coercion, and 
intimidation), ‘prior’ (timely disclosure of information), and ‘informed’ (relevant, understandable and accessible 
information), and apply to the entire project process and not to the early stages of the project alone. Additionally, 
the borrower will tailor its consultation process to the language preferences of the affected communities, their 
decision-making processes, and the needs of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups” (David M. Ong, From 
‘International’ to ‘Transnational’ Environmental Law? A Legal Assessment of the Contribution of the ‘Equator 
Principles’ to International Environmental Law, 79 Nordic Journal of International Law, 35, 64 (2010)).  
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Principles website, internal and external communications, public relations, advice and 
assistance with regards to adopting and implementing the Equator Principles, and the 
management of financial affairs.  
Decision-making within the Equator Principles Association aims at consensus-seeking which 
gets increasingly difficult the more EPFIs coming from heterogeneous backgrounds and 
having conflicting interests adopt the Equator Principles. Proposals are typically adopted 
when at least 50% of EPFIs (each EPFI has one vote) cast votes – so called quorum of half – 
and when 2/3 of them vote in favor of a particular proposal (i.e., basic rule of decision-
making).  
The annual fee for the financial year 1 July 2013-30 June 2014 is GBP £ 3,290. The fee 
covers all of the costs incurred in the administration, management, and further advancement 
of the Equator Principles. 
E. Equator Principles: The Third Generation 
The updated third generation of Equator Principles (EP III) consists of ten principles.33 The 
first principle (Review and Categorisation) requires the EPFIs to categorize each proposed 
project “based on the magnitude of its potential environmental and social risks and impacts.”34 The 
screening process is based on the environmental and social categorization process of the 
IFC.35 Category A projects are “Projects with potential significant adverse environmental and social risks 
and/or impacts that are diverse, [cumulative] irreversible or unprecedented”. Category B projects are 
“Projects with potential limited adverse environmental and social risks and/or impacts that are few in number, 
generally site-specific, largely reversible and readily addressed through mitigation measures.” Category C 
contains “Projects with minimal or no adverse environmental and social risks and/or impacts.” The 
categorization process is crucial due to the decision on which environmental and social 
standards and procedures are subsequently applied. The following Equator Principles apply to 
Category A and B projects only. Category C projects do not fall into the Equator Principles 
framework since they are socially and environmentally inoffensive; they can be classified as 
safe from an environmental, social and human rights perspective. 
Principle 2 (Environmental and Social Assessment) requires the client to conduct for all 
Category A and B projects an environmental and social assessment process to address all 
relevant environmental and social risks and impacts of the proposed project. The 
Environmental and Social Assessment Documentation should include “measures to minimize, 
mitigate, and offset adverse impacts.” It should also include an Environmental and Social Impact 
                                                          
33 Cp. Equator Principles Association (note 5). 
34 The following quotes refer to the third generation of the Equator Principles (EP III): cp. Id.  
35  Cp. International Finance Corporation (note 6). 
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Assessment (ESIA) and an Alternative Analysis for projects emitting more than 100,000 tons 
of CO2 equivalents annually.36 For these projects, an alternatives analysis has to be conducted 
to evaluate less GHG-intensive technologies and procedures.  
Which environmental and social standards are applicable depends on the location of the 
particular project. In ‘designated countries’ – i.e., mainly industrial and (high-income) OECD 
countries – compliance with host country laws, regulations and permits pertaining to 
environmental and social issues is required. In ‘non-designated countries’, however, 
compliance is also required with the IFC Performance Standards and the World Bank’s EHS 
Guidelines (Principle 3: Applicable Environmental and Social Standards).    
Principle 4 – Environmental and Social Management System and Equator Principles Action 
Plan – demands that the client develops and maintains an Environmental and Social 
Management System37 (ESMS) as well as an Environmental and Social Management Plan 
(ESMP). The overall aim is to comply with the applicable environmental and social standards. 
In case that the applicable standards are not met, the client and the EPFI will develop a joint 
Equator Principles Action Plan (AP).  
Principle 5 asks for an encompassing and constant stakeholder engagement process. Project-
affected communities and other stakeholder groups must have rights to information, 
consultation and influence. Of particular importance is the ‘informed consultation and 
participation’ (ICP) process, a process which ideally takes place in a “culturally appropriate 
manner”. Information has to be made readily and publicly available to the affected 
communities in their local languages. The disclosure of information (e.g., assessment 
documentation) should occur as early as possible in the assessment process – ideally within 
the planning stage and before construction commences – and on an ongoing basis. Moreover, 
project affected communities have to have the right to participate in decision-making (i.e., 
notion of Teilhabe and inclusion). Their voices have to be heard, and the interests and needs 
of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups shall be taken into consideration. The whole 
stakeholder engagement process should be free from external manipulation, interference, 
coercion and intimidation. Projects with adverse impacts on indigenous or aboriginal peoples 
                                                          
36 This includes Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions: Scope 1 emissions are direct GHG emissions from the facilities 
themselves while Scope 2 emissions refer to the indirect GHG emissions associated with the off-site production 
of energy used by the infrastructure or industry project (cp. Equator Principles Association (note 5), 19).    
37 Cp. for more information on E(S)MS: Stepan Wood, Environmental Management Systems and Public 
Authorities in Canada: Rethinking Environmental Governance, 10 Buffalo Environmental Law Journal, 129 
(2003); Stepan Wood, Green Revolution or Greenwash? Voluntary Environmental Standards, Public Law, and 
Private Authority in Canada, 123, 123 (Law Commission of Canada ed., 2003); Stepan Wood & Lynn 
Johannson, Six Principles for Integrating Non-Governmental Environmental Standards into Smart Regulation, 46 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 345 (2008).  
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even require ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ (FPIC). This consent, however, does not 
entail any veto rights nor does it require unanimity – a majority decision suffices. The 
practical challenge of course is how to implement FPIC in practice (cp. the paragraph on 
third-party beneficiary rights later on in this paper).   
The client is, furthermore, required by Principle 6 to establish a (project-level and worker) 
grievance mechanism (as part of the ESMS), which is “designed to receive and facilitate resolution of 
concerns and grievances about the Project’s environmental and social performance. […] It will seek to resolve 
concerns promptly, using an understandable and transparent consultative process that is culturally appropriate, 
readily accessible, at no cost, and without retribution to the party that originated the issue or concern.”  
In order to assess compliance with the principles, independent monitoring, reporting, and 
reviewing is required. Principles 7 and 9 deal with these topics. Principle 7 requires that an 
independent review of the Assessment Documentation (including ESMP, ESMS and 
stakeholder engagement process) is conducted by an independent environmental and social 
expert or consultant who is not directly linked with the client. Moreover, the consultant can 
propose a suitable action plan for the projects that are not in compliance with the Equator 
Principles. The projects which cause potential adverse impacts on indigenous peoples, critical 
habitat impacts, significant cultural heritage impacts, and large-scale resettlement are the most 
important projects.  
Principle 9 is devoted to independent monitoring and reporting. Here, an independent 
consultant or a “qualified and experienced external expert” is required in order to assess project 
compliance with the Equator Principles. The consultant or expert is responsible to verify 
monitoring and reporting information after financial close and over the life of the loan.  
The Covenants-Principle 8 also deals with compliance: It requires the client to “covenant in the 
financing documentation to comply with all relevant host country environmental and social laws, regulations and 
permits.” Furthermore, the client has to covenant to comply with the ESMP and Equator 
Principles action plan, to report publicly in an appropriate format (i.e., provide public reports), 
and to decommission facilities where applicable. Finally, “[w]here a client is not in compliance with 
its environmental and social covenants, the EPFI will work with the client on remedial actions to bring the 
Project back into compliance to the extent feasible. If the client fails to re-establish compliance within an agreed 
grace period, the EPFI reserves the right to exercise remedies, as considered appropriate.”38  
The final principle 10 deals with accountability in the form of reporting and transparency 
requirements both for clients and EPFIs. The client ensures that a summary of the ESIA is 
                                                          
38 “…EP 8 requires that the obligations imposed by the project lenders upon the project developers get 
formalized as covenants in the loan documentation between the bank syndicate and the project developer. By 
making these requirements covenants, the bank lenders can condition project financing upon their adequate 
fulfillment and can use their non-fulfillment as conditions of material default, that is, a basis for calling for 
repayment of the loan …” (Meyerstein (note 16), 26).  
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publicly available and readily accessible (i.e., online disclosure/publication). Principle 10 also 
requires the client to publicly report on GHG emission levels for projects emitting more than 
100,000 tons of CO2 equivalents annually.39 The EPFI is required to report publicly on an at 
least annual basis on “transactions that have reached Financial Close and on its Equator Principles 
implementation processes and experience, taking into account appropriate confidentiality considerations.” The 
EPFI is further requested to provide additional information on the total number of deals 
financed under the Equator Principles, the number of Category A, B and C projects, the 
sector, region, and country of financed projects as well as information with regards to Equator 
Principles implementation (i.e., credit and risk management policies), independent review, 
role of senior management, internal preparation and (ongoing) staff-training, etc. Project 
names will be conveyed to the Equator Principles Association. Given the client’s approval, 
this information might be made public on the Equator Principles website in the near future.   
The Governance Rules as well as the legal Disclaimer state that “the Equator Principles do not 
create any rights in, or liability to, any person, public or private.” EPFIs adopt and implement the 
Equator Principles on a voluntary, legally non-binding basis. The Equator Principles 
framework is, therefore, voluntary in use relying purely on self-enforcement and the goodwill 
of EPFIs; no mandatory obligations or direct punitive actions can arise from the principles 
themselves (i.e., exclusion of liability).40  
F. A Critical Economic-Ethical Evaluation 
The following paragraphs critically examine and evaluate the Equator Principles from an 
economic ethics and business ethics perspective. It weighs the pros and cons and investigates 
what has been achieved so far and which necessary reform steps should be adopted in the 
future. The main aim is to provide a baseline for a revision of EP III and pave the way 
towards EP IV. 
I. Limited Scope of the Equator Principles  
One major flaw of the Equator Principles is that they apply ‘only’ to project finance; the 
Equator Principles are restricted to the narrow definition of project finance. As it has been 
pointed out already, the project finance sector is a small segment for multinational financial 
                                                          
39 Interestingly, the new IFC Performance Standards require annual reports for projects emitting over 25,000(!) 
(and not 100,000) tonnes of CO2 equivalent annually. The Equator Principles threshold is much higher than the 
one of the IFC Performance Standards. Thus, the Equator Principles fall behind the commitments made by the 
IFC Performance Standards. “EP III does not contain any commitments on issues that are beyond[!] what is 
included in the IFC Performance Standards. In some cases the commitment in EP III is even below what is 
required in IFC PS (such as reporting requirements on CO2 emissions)” (cp. BankTrack, Tiny steps forward on 
the Outside Job. Comments on the Equator Principles III Official First Draft, 8 (2012), available at: 
www.banktrack.org/show/pages/equator_principles#tab_pages_documents  (accessed 11 July 2013). The 
Equator Principles should ideally go above and beyond the IFC Performance Standards and not fall behind.    
40 Cp. Jane Andrew, Responsible Finance?: The Equator Principles and Bank Disclosures, 14 Journal of 
American Academy Business, 302, 306 (2009). 
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institutions. The sector commonly accounts for up to 5% of the overall turnover of major 
banks. Therefore, project finance portfolios are rather small and what is even worse is that the 
portion is declining.41 When taking a closer look at general financial market trends in recent 
years, it becomes clear that multinational banks have shifted their banking activities more 
towards the highly profitable investment banking sector. As a consequence, the Equator 
Principles apply only to a small fraction of major bank’s total activities.42 What is required 
from an economic ethics perspective is a deeper engagement: The application of the Equator 
Principles should be extended to other business segments and departments within a firm. The 
“Spirit of the Equator Principles”43 should ideally be embedded throughout the whole 
company and across product categories; it should be internalized in the sense that it is part of 
the core activities of multinational banks and insurance companies. Required are, thus, an 
outreach to neighboring fields and a spillover to other finance areas. As a minimum 
requirement, the Equator Principles should be extended to cover not only project finance, but 
any transactions with a potential significant adverse impact on the socio-ecological 
environment, local communities and in particular aboriginal peoples. Here, the third 
generation with its inclusion of project-related corporate loans and bridge loans is a major 
step forward to ‘Go Beyond Project Finance’44, although, it remains to examine whether this 
extension of scope has any practical meaning.45 Thus, a future reform of the Equator 
Principles (EP IV) should include (all forms of) export finance and other forms of corporate 
lending and financing. To put it differently: The scope of the Equator Principles should at 
minimum be “extended from ‘project finance’ to ‘financing projects.’”46   
II. Special Case: The BRIC Countries  
So far, a high number of BRIC countries’ banks are not members of the Equator Principles 
Association.47 Especially, the new economic powerhouses, China and India, are 
                                                          
41 Yet, the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the deregulation of state monopolies and key industry 
sectors (e.g., electricity and telecommunication sectors) in developing countries and emerging markets in 
combination with the overall trend towards globalization boost the project finance sector (cp. Scholtens & Dam 
(note 18)).    
42 Cp. Lazarus & Feldbaum (note 4), iii. 
43 John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators? The Equator 
Principles, 33 Law and Policy, 542, 547 (2011). 
44 Lazarus & Feldbaum (note 4), iii/8. EP I was solely restricted to project finance. EP II included advisory 
services related to project finance. EP III goes one step further and incorporates project-related corporate loans 
and bridge loans. EP IV ideally extends the scope and goes beyond project finance including all forms of 
corporate financing, export financing, etc.  
45 Cp. BankTrack (note 39), 8. 
46 BankTrack, The Outside Job. Turning the Equator Principles towards people and planet, 11 (2011), available 
at: www.banktrack.org/show/pages/equator_principles (accessed 11 July 2013). 
47 One noteworthy exception is Brazil. Here, 5 financial institutions joined the Equator Principles Association. 
Another exception, although, the country is not part of the BRIC countries, is South Africa. Here, 3 financial 
institutions have adopted the Equator Principles. 
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underrepresented when it comes to the adoption of the Equator Principles. As of November 
2013, only one Chinese (Industrial Bank Co.), one Indian (IDFC Limited), and one Russian 
bank (Otkritie) have joined the Equator Principles Association. In particular, the major Asian 
players are still missing, e.g., Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction 
Bank, ICICI Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Sberbank, State Bank 
of India, etc.48 Especially, China is of major importance since China is a major cross-border 
lender that is even larger than the World Bank Group.49  
In total, only five Asian banks – one Chinese, one Russian and three Japanese banks – are 
members of the Equator Principles Association. Asian banks now represent a tiny fraction of 
all EPFIs (6.4%); Equator banks from emerging markets represent around 25-35% of EPFIs 
(depending on the definition of emerging markets), while there is still a high concentration of 
Western-European, North-American and Australian EPFIs accounting for up to 65% of all 
EPFIs.50 51 out of 78 EPFIs are from industrialized countries – a fact which contrasts heavily 
with the regional distribution of project finance markets and the tremendous growth of project 
finance transactions in Asia.  
The most recent financial market crisis as well as the European sovereign debt crisis – the so 
called Eurozone crisis – have caused fundamental shifts and changes in the global project 
finance markets. While the share of North-American and European banks in project finance 
markets has dropped dramatically – due to limited liquidity, constrained risk appetite, mergers 
and acquisitions (by governments) and as a consequence reduced or closed project finance 
business activities –, the share of project finance activities in emerging markets has rocketed – 
accounting now for up to 45% of the market in 2012 (up from 22% in 2008). Recent years 
have witnessed not only a tremendous growth of project finance activity in emerging markets, 
but also an increasing Asian, or to be precise: Chinese dominance in (project) finance 
markets: By 2012, the top 5 project finance banks were all Asian.  
                                                          
48 Other global players which have not yet joined the Equator Principles club are the Deutsche Bank, Morgan 
Stanley, and the Swiss UBS.  
49 “As much as the EPs have grown to become an industry standard, they have, thus, far not successfully 
penetrated key emerging markets where a tremendous amount of project finance – and some of the largest 
individual deals – have been done in recent years, namely, India, China and Russia. In the first quarter of 2011, 
the top 25 lending banks were split almost evenly between the EPs and Indian and Chinese institutions: Indian 
and Chinese banks covered 38.6 percent of the market and EPFIs covered 33.9 percent. Moreover, the very 
largest individual projects sponsored in the first quarter of 2011 were nearly all in either India, China or Russia 
…” (Meyerstein (note 16), 20).  
50 Most of the member institutions are from high-income OECD countries such as Australia (4 EPFIs), Canada 
(7), France (4), Germany (4), Spain (5), the Netherlands (6), UK (5), and the United States (5). One reason is that 
Western-European and North-American financial institutions face strong reputational pressure to become ‘green’ 
and to behave in a socially responsible manner. 
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Two of the top ten project finance banks were not EPFIs, namely the State Bank of India and 
the Korea Development Bank.51 Moreover, most of the Chinese financial institutions which 
display huge growth rates in all financial market segments are not (yet) Equator banks – a fact 
which brings us to our next point of criticism that various non-Equator Principles deals are 
carried out in BRIC countries with serious and detrimental consequences for the environment 
and the people affected by project finance transactions. 
One of the biggest problems in developing or emerging countries is that environmental and 
social governmental regulations are often inadequate and rather poor. The Equator Principles 
could help establishing worldwide minimum environmental and social standards – at least for 
the project finance sector. In addition, these countries face the problem of “environmental 
shopping”52: Borrowers and clients that are unconcerned with the environmental and social 
impacts of their projects can easily reduce their transaction costs by shopping the project 
around until they find a lender with the lowest environmental and social standards and 
requirements.53 If bank A – an EPFI – refuses to finance a particular project, non-Equator 
banks B, C or D might do so, and the Equator bank A might lose a lucrative business (bank A, 
thus, faces a dilemma situation). As a direct consequence of ‘environmental shopping’, 
environmental and social standards are circumvented and undermined.54   
This is all the more important given the geographical limitations and the missing global 
coverage of the Equator Principles which threaten the de facto impact of the Equator 
Principles in the global project finance market. With some major project finance lenders not 
being part of the Equator Principles Association, the playing field is not completely leveled.55 
Chinese, Indian and Russian banks have the potential to undermine the whole project by 
financing ‘dirty projects’. Therefore, it is crucial to win over the major financial institutions in 
these countries. The status quo needs to be overcome in order to prevent disadvantages for 
member banks, to minimize the problem of environmental shopping and to secure global 
socio-environmental standards. A broader geographic diversification and an outreach to BRIC 
countries are required. The regional scope of the Equator Principles has to be extended in 
                                                          
51 Cp. Thomson Reuters, Project Finance Review Full Year 2012; available at: 
http://dmi.thomsonreuters.com/Content/Files/Q42012_Project_Finance_Review.pdf (accessed: 11 November 
2013); Lazarus (note 30). 
52 Nwete (note 12), 178. 
53 Cp. Hardenbrook (note 20), 212. 
54 The Equator Principles as an industry-wide standard theoretically help to prevent ‘environmental shopping’ by 
creating a level playing field. The greater uniformity and commonality among project financiers make it harder 
for corporations to pit one financial institution against the other and to negotiate or water down environmental 
and social standards (cp. Id., 211). Yet, the missing global coverage and outreach to BRIC countries impedes the 
(entire) abolition of ‘environmental shopping’.       
55 Cp. Lazarus (note 30). 
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order to assure the worldwide compliance with UN and IFC environmental, social and human 
rights standards. It is one major task of the Equator Principles Association in the upcoming 
years to promote the Equator Principles in other geographical areas.56  
One follow-up problem of expanding Equator Principles membership in emerging markets 
and developing countries might be the rising tension between broadening and deepening the 
membership57: When more and more financial institutions from different regional areas, 
different cultural backgrounds and heterogeneous financial interests become member of the 
Equator Principles Association, consensus-seeking becomes increasingly difficult. The 
increasing diversity, heterogeneity and complexity might lead to conflicting interests across 
geographies. The danger comes up that only the lowest common denominator is found (which 
seems to be already the case).58 One way out of this dilemma between deepening and 
broadening might be a tiered membership structure reflecting different aspirations. We will 
come back to this reform proposal by Lazarus/Feldbaum in paragraph 11). 
III. Lack of Transparency  
One major problem concerning the Equator Principles is the lack of publicly disclosed 
information (i.e., problem of limited or no disclosure). Public consultation and public 
disclosure of information are often prevented by confidentiality duties towards clients.59 In 
some cases, banks “hide behind excessive interpretations of ‘client confidentiality’ to withhold information 
to stakeholders and the public”.60 However, it is in the bank’s own interest to not hide behind 
confidentiality issues (i.e., overcoming of disclosure concerns) and to be more open-minded 
towards stakeholder dialogue and engagement. Inclusion rather than secrecy as well as a spirit 
of openness and transparency might help to restore the public trust lost in the banking sector – 
especially in the aftermath of the latest financial market crisis. 
A further problem related to the lack of transparency is the lack of (consistent) reporting 
standards and a lack of agreed standards for audits.61 So far, reporting most often is limited 
                                                          
56 Cp. Lazarus & Feldbaum (note 4), 6; Conley & Williams (note 43), 557/566.   
57  Cp. Lazarus & Feldbaum (note 4), iii. 
58 BankTrack ((note 39), 4) criticizes the EP III (draft) for being a “watered down compromise between parties 
with a widely divergent view on matters, with those Equator banks aiming for a more ambitious new ‘gold 
standard’ clearly loosing the debate from those who are fine with a little tinkering on the edges”. 
59 On the one hand, breaches of client confidentiality “can entail civil or criminal sanctions and damage 
relationship between a lender and its client” (Richardson (note 26), 287). On the other hand, “NGOs have 
complained that this caveat [‘appropriate confidentiality considerations’] is a hindrance to disclosure and 
transparency. They have found that banks are characterizing many relevant issues as “commercially sensitive” 
and, as such exempt from disclosure for reasons of confidentiality” (Kirsten Mikadze, Public Participation in 
Global Environmental Governance and the Equator Principles: Potential and Pitfalls, 13 German Law Journal, 
1386, 1406 (2012)). 
60 BankTrack (note 46), 5; Wright (note 20), 64. 
61 Cp. Equator Principles Association, Guidance Note on Equator Principles Implementation Reporting (2011), 
available at: http://equator-principles.com/index.php/reporting-requirements  (accessed 11 November 2013). 
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and inconsistent. Enhanced and consistent reporting standards are required to promote 
transparency. It remains to be seen whether the new reporting requirements of EP III (cp. 
Principle 10) will help to overcome the lack of transparency and accountability. As it looks, 
the EP III reporting requirements with their (more) detailed information on the Equator 
Principles portfolio (i.e., detailed composition, regional and sectoral breakdown) are a step in 
the right direction. However, what is still missing is a mandatory(!) revelation and online 
disclosure (on the website of the Equator Principles Association) of all project names and 
project sponsors that are financed ‘under’ the Equator Principles. Detailed information on the 
Equator Principles implementation and compliance should be made public: Which projects 
got approved, which transactions got declined, and for what reasons? Which projects are in 
compliance with the Equator Principles and which ones are not, and for what reasons? In the 
case of non-compliance, which corrective measures have been adopted in order to bring the 
project back to compliance?62  
In order to enhance transparency at the project level, an encompassing stakeholder dialogue 
and engagement process is crucial. Locally affected communities and especially indigenous 
peoples have to have full rights to information, consultation/participation and influence, and 
full access to all relevant information.63 This is tackled by the updated Principle 5 and its 
‘Informed Consultation and Participation’ and ‘Free, Prior, and Informed Consent’ paradigms. 
The practical challenge of course is how to implement it in reality – this remains to be seen. 
Different interpretations of what FPIC entails might prevent its full realization. E.g., who is 
affected? Who gives consent? What constitutes consent? For which projects should FPIC be 
sought – for projects impacting indigenous peoples or universal application of FPIC to all 
projects? Who counts as indigenous peoples? Are they adequately represented – in terms of 
gender, age and societal structure? Who is responsible for seeking FPIC – the state or the 
company? Does FPIC require a binding consultation or is an informative consultation 
sufficient? Does FPIC grant any veto rights? Does it require unanimity? If a majority is 
sufficient, which majority rule should be followed? Does 51-per-cent approval constitute 
consent? Is two-thirds’ majority approval of a project sufficient for consent? And what 
happens in cases when consent cannot be reached and third-party mediation fails? 
Stakeholder engagement has also to be enhanced within the Equator Principles Association: A 
structural reform in the form of a creation of an EP Advisory Group with representatives from 
                                                          
62 Cp. BankTrack (note 46); BankTrack (note 39). 
63 Cp. the 1989 ILO’s Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, the 1992 Rio Declaration on the 
Environment and Development, the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters as well as the 2007 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
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stakeholder and civil society groups and an EP Forum for engagement on finance industry 
sustainability issues seems promising.64 The inclusion of stakeholder groups and especially 
NGOs in decision-making processes of the Equator Principles Association could raise the 
legitimacy of the Equator Principles and help to further strengthen it. The feedback EPFIs will 
receive from the various civil society organizations will be of great help to overcome practical 
challenges.     
IV. Lack of External Accountability and Liability  
The Disclaimer of the Equator Principles states that the Principles do not create any rights or 
liabilities. As such, it ensures that there are no mandatory obligations or direct punitive 
actions that can arise from the Principles. The Equator Principles framework is a voluntary, 
legally non-binding governance system that relies on self-enforcement. Minimum entry 
requirements and absolute performance standards are lacking. Furthermore, clear, verifiable 
metrics that are transparently and independently monitored are absent as well.65 In sum, no 
formal mechanism exists to ensure accountability and liability.66 When it comes to 
accountability, liability (and transparency), the current Equator Principles framework is not an 
appropriate governance system; especially in this regard, the EP framework requires a further 
improvement and strengthening of its governance regime.  
This lack of accountability at an institutional (macro level), organizational (meso level) and 
individual project level (micro level)67 has negative effects on the EPFIs as well as project-
affected communities and local stakeholder groups: Irresponsible business activities 
negatively affect the organizational legitimacy of financial institutions. They might open or 
widen the legitimacy gap between organizational and social values respectively between 
current business practices and societal expectations and perceptions. In the end, they might 
threaten the reputational capital of a company.68 Even worse, a lack of accountability and 
responsibility often leads to adverse environmental, social and human rights impacts with 
serious consequences especially for indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups. EPFIs’ 
accountability to the public, to project-affected communities, stakeholders and shareholders is 
therefore indispensable.  
                                                          
64 Cp. Lazarus & Feldbaum (note 4), 10; BankTrack (note 46), 10; BankTrack (note 39). 
65 Donald H. Schepers, The Equator Principles: a promise in progress?, 11 Corporate Governance, 90, 101 
(2011). 
66 Although, it is true that financial institutions can escape legal liability for violating the Equator Principles, they 
cannot avoid being accountable in the ‘court of public opinion’. In case that an EPFI fails to meet public 
expectations, public criticism will occur and the company’s brand reputation will suffer. Moreover, socially 
responsible investment (SRI) groups might reduce or withdraw their investments (cp. Hardenbrook (note 20), 
231).    
67 Cp. O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer (note 21), 556. 
68 Cp. Haack et al. (note 10), 23; O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer (note 21). 
22 
 
Some commentators even go as far as to claim third-party beneficiary rights for project-
affected communities69 in order to enhance accountability and liability. These rights would 
allow non-signatories to a contract (i.e., project-affected communities) to enforce their rights 
against the contracting parties (i.e., lender and borrower). A third-party beneficiary status 
would provide a right to a promised performance enforceable by a non-signatory to a contract. 
This approach proposed by Marco70 would hold both borrowers and lenders accountable for 
failing to adhere to the Equator Principles. It, thus, contains a right to proper Equator 
Principles implementation. Borrowers and lenders as promisors owe duties of performance to 
project-affected communities as local stakeholders, that, if breached are enforceable by the 
respective communities. EPFIs and clients that violate the Equator Principles could be sued71: 
Project-affected communities would be able to assert their third-party beneficiary rights 
through breach of contract actions in US72, Canadian73 or (Western) European courts. The 
overall aim is to curb negative environmental and social impacts on local communities and to 
ensure that project-affected communities and indigenous peoples maintain their livelihoods.74    
                                                          
69 The Alien Tort Claims Act in the United States allows US-American companies to be sued by foreigners from 
the host country in US courts for torts committed abroad. Domestic courts become increasingly aware of human 
rights abuses committed on foreign soil and the need to grant legal standing for the victims. More and more 
litigations are brought before domestic courts for distant human rights violations, perpetrated by governments or 
private actors such as multinational companies (cp. Imai et al. (note 20), 137; Imai et al. (note 20); Peer, 
Zumbansen, Globalization and the Law: Deciphering the Message of Transnational Human Rights Litigation, 5 
German Law Journal, 1499 (2004); Peer Zumbansen, Beyond Territoriality: The Case of Transnational Human 
Rights Litigation, 4 Constitutionalism Web-Papers (2005), available at: www.wiso.uni-
hamburg.de/fileadmin/sowi/politik/governance/ConWeb_Papers/conweb4-2005.pdf (accessed 31 July 2013); 
Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 738 (Jan Smits ed., 2006).    
70 Cp. Marco (note 10). 
71 If a lawsuit could be brought against an EPFI for violating the Equator Principles, this would have significant 
consequences: EPFIs would have an increased incentive to strictly screen and monitor financed projects in order 
to avoid lawsuits (and the fines for violating environmental and social laws, the court fees for defending against 
these lawsuits, and the damage to the brand reputation). Yet, this possibility would also create a large 
disincentive for other banks to join the Equator Principles Association, and already members of the Equator 
Principles could leave the Association to avoid being sued (cp. Hardenbrook (note 20), 218). Nevertheless, 
accountability, liability and transparency are indispensable aspects of an effective governance regime: Global 
environmental, social and human rights standards can only be established and effectively monitored when the 
relevant actors can be held accountable for their practices. Moreover, third-party beneficiary rights and the 
possibility of lawsuits could also help to separate free-riders that are merely interested in gaining reputational 
benefits from those EPFIs that are truly committed to the ‘Spirit of the Equator Principles’.     
72 Cp. the 1789 US-Alien Tort Statue/Alien Tort Claims Act: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States” (28 U.S.C. § 1350). 
73 Cp. Supreme Court of Canada, Judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada:  
Ezokola v. Canada (2013), available at: http://scc.lexum.org/decisia-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-
csc/en/item/13184/index.do (accessed 25 July 2013). 
74 Cp. Marco (note 10); Hardenbrook (note 20), 218. 
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V. Inadequate Monitoring  
So far, Equator Principles compliance relies mainly on passive or interactive monitoring.75 
NGOs, civil society organizations, and other stakeholder groups function as watchdogs.76 In 
case of apparent non-compliance – i.e., corporate governance scandals and serious violations 
of environmental, social and human rights standards – NGOs might start public ‘naming and 
shaming’ campaigns. These protests often catch media attention and as a consequence might 
cause public outcry and negative reputational effects for the involved EPFIs and their clients. 
In fact, most of the founding members of the Equator Principles have been targeted by NGO 
criticism and civil society organizations’ advocacy campaigns. Therefore, it is in the EPFIs 
own best interest to take preventative measures and to boost their credibility and reputation 
relative to critics.   
 In order to avoid reputational threats, an active and ‘internal’ form of monitoring is required. 
A mandatory, independent and transparent third-party assessment of compliance – e.g., in the 
form of an independent Equator Principles ombudsman77 – is needed (Principles 7 and 9 deal 
with these requirements in particular. It remains to be seen whether they are able to establish a 
properly working independent review and monitoring system). This impartial verification of 
conformity should be based on absolute performance standards as well as clear, verifiable 
metrics that are transparently monitored – both aspects are still missing in the third generation 
of the Equator Principles. Finally, official and joint project-level grievance mechanisms as 
well as third-party complaint (and dispute settlement) mechanisms78 at the corporate or 
industry-level are needed to address inadequate implementation and non-compliance. These 
compliance mechanisms should conform to the principles of legitimacy, accessibility, 
predictability, equitability, rights-compatibility, and transparency. It is important to examine 
whether Principle 6 of the third generation of Equator Principles might be able to establish 
effective and efficient project-level grievance and complaint mechanisms.  
                                                          
75 Cp. Doug Sarro, Do Lenders Make Effective Regulators? An Assessment of the Equator Principles on Project 
Finance, 13 German Law Journal, 1522, 1542 (2012). 
76  Cp. O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer (note 21). 
77 The IFC has already established an ombudsman and compliance officer; cp. IFC Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman, CAO Annual Report 2013, 1 (2013), available at: http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/publications/documents/CAO_AR13_ENG_high.pdf (accessed: 11 November 2013).  
78 These third-party complaint mechanisms on the associational level could complement client’s project-level 
grievance mechanisms. These mechanisms ideally help to enhance corporate credibility and reputation by 
fostering lender and client compliance. They also help to overcome the problem of free-riding (due to the fact 
that the detection of free-riding and cheating is more likely) and help to avoid collective-action problems (among 
EPFIs and within the Equator Principles Association) and principle-agent problems (between lenders (EPFIs as 
principals) and sponsors/clients (as agents). Interestingly, EPFIs play a double role: they function as self-
regulators and regulators: the Equator Principles regulate Equator banks (being part of the regulating Equator 
Principles Association) as well as EPFIs’ clients via loan documentation and covenants (i.e., hierarchical 
relationship) (cp. Anne Flohr, A Complaint Mechanism for the Equator Principles – and Why Equator Members 
should urgently want it, Transnational Legal Theory (forthcoming in 2014)). 
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VI. Lack of Implementation and Enforcement  
The Equator Principles are a set of voluntary guidelines without appropriate accountability, 
monitoring and auditing systems. The self-regulatory regime is rather ineffective since a 
credible deterrent, an ‘enforcement pyramid’ (including delisting79 and exclusion of non-
compliant EPFIs) and formal sanctions are absent (cp. paragraph 8 on sanctions). Moreover, 
lots of loopholes, grey areas and a discretionary leeway exist in order to circumvent the 
Equator Principles in myriad ways (cp. paragraph 9 on exit-door strategies).  
A further related problem is the lack of committed resources to the implementation of the 
Equator Principles by the respective EPFIs. The Equator Principles need to be embedded 
throughout the whole organization. All levels of the organization should internalize the ‘Spirit 
of the Equator Principles’. Some of the important factors are environmental and social 
management systems, environmental and social risk management, and monitoring and 
auditing systems. Environmental and social risk management as well as CSR should ideally 
be integrated into the company’s core businesses. Furthermore, recruitment, outside 
consultation, staff and front-line training as well as awareness rising and sensitizing are 
essential. Of eminent importance is the top-level commitment: The CEO and other senior or 
top-level managers function as role-models. A change in organizational culture also affects 
the incentive structures and in particular the bonus payment systems that should be long- 
rather than short-term oriented.   
Finally, it is required to enhance funding and staffing of the Equator Principles Association 
(i.e., reform of the Equator Principles Association). The currently available financial and 
personal resources are not sufficient to guarantee proper assistance and advice with regards to 
Equator Principles implementation and to effectively monitor compliance with Equator 
Principles standards. “The EP Association has reached a point where its ambitions exceed its current 
capacity to deliver on those ambitions. It simply needs more resources and more structure to address its 
challenges and more capably fulfill its vision. At this point, the Association is dependent on bare bones fees and 
the generosity of EPFI members willing to contribute their limited time to the work of the Association. […] 
run[ing the Equator Principles Association] […] on a minima budget is unsustainable. Of all voluntary 
organizations reviewed, the EP Association has the lowest annual fees and the smallest secretariat. The EP 
Association needs additional dedicated professional resources to continue to flourish and sustain momentum. 
[…] The EP Secretariat needs dedicated professional resources to develop training materials, organize the work 
to establish membership standards and assistance for new members and a transparency framework, develop and 
                                                          
79 So far, a de-listing is possible according to the Equator Principles Association Governance Rules, if an EPFI 
fails to report publicly within 18 months or if it does not pay the annual fee. Only in these cases will an EPFI be 
removed from the list and, thus, be no longer a member of the Equator Principles Association (a re-adoption, 
however, is still possible). Yet, it is not planned to de-list a company due to non-compliance.   
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maintain a website, publish an EP Association annual report, establish reporting guidelines, to name just a 
few.”80   
VII. Lack of Effectiveness and Practical Failure  
EPFIs are still financing controversial projects, i.e., projects that are socially and 
environmentally destructive and unsustainable. This is especially true for developing 
countries where investors try to maximize profits while shirking contractual responsibilities 
(covenants) in project-affected communities.81 The funding of ‘dirty projects’ continues. 
Some of the most controversial projects include large scale oil and gas projects (e.g., in the 
Arctic), massive fossil fuel projects, in particular coal fired power plants which have huge 
negative impacts on climate change by emitting billions of tons of GHG that are released into 
the atmosphere.82  
The aim of EP III is to limit GHG emissions and in general, negative externalities of project 
finance. The Equator Principles Association should reconsider whether significantly high 
emitting projects succeeding a certain threshold should be automatically excluded from 
financing. So far, a categorical exclusion of projects and business activities with a high impact 
on climate change/global warming does not exist.  
A further problem concerns the financing of nuclear power plants which are from an 
environmental perspective highly destructive and unsustainable (i.e., the problem of finding 
an adequate permanent repository site for nuclear waste), leaving aside the inherent risks and 
dangers of nuclear energy (i.e., the nuclear catastrophes in Chernobyl/Ukraine and 
Fukushima/Japan and other worst case scenarios including terrorist attacks on nuclear power 
plants).   
In summary, non-compliance continues. The Equator Principles are still violated in practice 
on both sides: Both borrowers and lenders fail to implement the Equator Principles in 
practice. Reasons for Equator Principles breaches are the failure of an enforcement 
mechanism, the lack of formal sanctions, the lack of objective and verifiable metrics to 
measure performance, a lack of transparent monitoring, and last not least, an inconsistent 
Equator Principles implementation: The latter should be overcome by facilitating knowledge 
transfer, information sharing, and membership capacity building especially via the Equator 
Principles Association. The website/intranet of the Equator Principles Association is the ideal 
place to provide all EPFIs with case studies, training materials, guidelines, implementation 
                                                          
80 Lazarus & Feldbaum (note 4), iii. 
81 Cp. Marco (note 10), 453. 
82 Cp. BankTrack (note 46), 13; BankTrack (note 39), 10. 
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tools and resources. Best practice workshops and regional workshops should be organized in 
order to help EPFIs with Equator Principles implementation.83  
VIII. Sanctions  
Monitoring, enforcement, and sanctions/sanctioning belong together. They form an 
indissoluble triangle. In all three regards, the Equator Principles lack proper governance 
mechanisms. With regards to sanctions the question comes up, whether the Equator Principles 
have enough bite to penalize institutions that fall behind their voluntary commitments? 
Currently, EPFIs face few sanctions should they not comply with the Equator Principles 
governance structures. So far, only public naming and shaming campaigns that cause media 
attention put EPFIs and their clients under pressure.84 Especially NGOs functioning as 
watchdogs have a powerful position when it comes to reputational pressure. They help to 
ensure that non-state actors such as multinational companies abide by their voluntary 
commitments and guidelines (e.g., corporate human rights responsibility, responsibility for 
sustainable development and environmental stewardship). Nevertheless, this passive and ex-
post way of monitoring is not sufficient to prevent non-compliance. What is needed is the 
establishment of a credible deterrent and an ‘enforcement pyramid’. This pyramid should start 
with less coercive means like persuasion (i.e., appeal to lender’s and client’s environmental 
and social responsibilities), warnings (i.e., highlighting potential consequences of continued 
violation of the Equator Principles), and setting deadlines for bringing projects back into 
compliance. Only when less coercive means fail, should more coercive tactics be employed. 
These tactics include formal sanctions like fines and penalties. The final stage of such an 
enforcement pyramid should include the delisting of non-compliant institutions and an 
exclusion of EPFIs that do not meet the standards set by the Equator Principles Association.85  
IX. Exit-Door Strategies  
The Equator Principles are vaguely and sometimes even ambiguously formulated leaving 
enough discretionary leeway for diverging interpretations. The language used is often more 
declaratory rather than compulsory and imperative; some principles are conditional in nature, 
others contain mere recommendations. Words like ‘should’, ‘intend’, ‘aim’, ‘encourage’86, 
‘make aware of’, ‘commit’ etc. are used, while other legal terminology usually applied such 
as ‘shall’, ‘must’, ‘will’, ‘oblige’, etc. is more or less avoided (the Equator Principles are 
written in ‘should’ not in ‘shall’ language which implies no legal obligations).  
                                                          
83  Cp. Lazarus & Feldbaum (note 4), 8. 
84 “… exposure of an EPFI to public scrutiny can […] be a powerful and effective tool in holding corporations to 
their voluntary commitments” (Lee (note 20), 362). 
85 Cp. Sarro (note 75), 1549. 
86 What happens if ‘encouraging’ and ‘awareness rising’ do not lead to anything? Which sanctions do exist? 
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In addition, a number of loopholes and grey areas exist that undercut the Equator Principles’ 
ability to ensure environmental and social stewardship.87 Borrowers and lenders are able to 
circumvent the ‘contractual obligations’ of the Equator Principles in myriad ways in order to 
avoid being classified as high risk.88 One way for banks is to redefine their project finance 
activities as representing something else, e.g., corporate finance, export finance, etc. 
Furthermore, project financiers classify their projects as category B or C with the aim to avoid 
a stricter A classification (i.e., backdoor-option).89   
X. Adoption Motives90  
Especially NGOs accuse EPFIs of green-washing and window-dressing91: An often heard 
criticism is that the Equator Principles engagement is just a public relations exercise (i.e., 
CSR as a mere rhetoric device). Multinational banks, so the argument goes, are merely 
interested in the branding benefits and the increased reputational capital. Their main aim is to 
avoid naming and shaming campaigns, negative media coverage and public criticism that 
might threaten banks’ reputational capital. As such, adopting the Equator Principles is just 
seen as a precautionary measure against the potential threat of public outcry and a form of 
managing non-financial risk (e.g., reputational risk management). Response to socio-political 
stakeholder pressure is seen here as the main motive behind the adoption of the Equator 
Principles. The adoption is, thus, mainly motivated by strategic reasons and not by intrinsic 
motives.  
Others criticize that the EPFIs aim to avoid mandatory and formal, state-run regulations and 
the costs accompanied with this potential future regulatory compliance. Firms use the freedom 
                                                          
87 E.g., the alternatives analysis requires “the evaluation of technically(!) and(!) financially feasible and cost-
effective(!) options” leaving enough discretionary leeway for the involved EPFIs and their clients.   
88 Cp. Marco (note 10), 470. 
89 Cp. Haack et al. (note 10), 21; Wright (note 20), 68. 
90 The main motives for financial institutions to adopt the Equator Principles include the following ones: 1. Level 
the playing field; 2. managing financial risks/credit risk mitigation; 3. reputational risk management/managing 
non-financial risks. Beside these economic and self-interested rationales for EP adoption (i.e., EPFIs are 
regarded as private profit seeking entities that try to minimize financial risks, legislative risks, and reputational 
risks and/or try to follow a differentiation-based strategy that allows them to achieve competitive advantages), 
altruistic motives also seem to play an at least minor role: Among them are good corporate citizenship, 
environmental consciousness, public goods preferences (i.e., CSR and environmental protection/sustainability as 
public goods), social preferences or warm-glow preferences of employees, investors and consumers, etc. (cp. 
Matthew Chan, What about Psychological Actors? Behavioral Analysis of Equator Principles Adoption and Its 
Implications, 13 German Law Journal, 1339 (2012); Conley & Williams (note 43), 550; Kulkarni (note 18); 
Macve & Chen (note 11), 894; see also the paragraph on philosophy and economics in this paper).  
91 Cp. for an opposing view: Scholtens & Dam (note 18), 1308: “We do not find support for the view that 
adoption of the Equator Principles is merely window dressing, since there are at least some costs involved” (e.g., 
larger operational, screening, and implementation costs; Equator Principles compliance might also lead to a 
delay in project completion due to the time-consuming requirements). The costs, however, are outweighed by the 
benefits of signing up (e.g., reduced reputational risk/better reputation, positive impact on (financial) risk profile, 
better market access, charging of premium prices, enhanced possibilities to recruit high quality employees, etc.).   
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of self-regulation to pre-empt governmental regulations. By adopting the Equator Principles, 
they can decrease this threat of potential regulation and the accompanied compliance costs.  
Furthermore, the Equator Principles are criticized for their symbolic nature (i.e., ‘economy of 
symbolism’): According to that, the Equator Principles are a mere symbolic gesture leaving 
enough flexibility and discretionary leeway and a minimal appeasement strategy aiming to 
appease NGOs and other stakeholder groups.92  
It is almost impossible to figure out the particular and concrete motives of EPFIs that made 
them adopt the Equator Principles – most likely, it is an interdependent mixture of financial 
and non-financial rationales. Yet, it is clear that the adoption process has to be followed by an 
adequate embedding and implementation process. The ‘Spirit of the Equator Principles’ has to 
be internalized, otherwise, they remain a ‘paper tiger’ (i.e., high-minded commitments on 
paper that fail to be enforced in practice93) and a corporate public relations’ tool for green-
washing and window dressing purposes only. In case that the Equator Principles are (at least 
partially) backed by an intrinsic motivation (among other motives), voluntary codes of 
conduct such as the Equator Principles can serve as signaling devices that demonstrate 
positive (ethical or ‘green’) credentials. They help to communicate commitments to 
environmental and business ethics to external stakeholders with the aim to strengthen 
corporate reputation and organizational legitimacy.94 In case that intrinsic motivation is 
entirely lacking, the danger comes up that environmentalism is a ‘rich man’s game’, i.e., 
compliance with environmental and social standards is only ensured in economically 
prosperous times. It is rather unlikely that voluntary codes of ethics will succeed in a weak 
economic climate. If this would be the case, then the future of the Equator Principles would 
depend on the state of the global economy.95  
XI. Free-riding and Adverse Selection  
The motives behind the adoption of the Equator Principles bring us to our next point of 
criticism – the problem of free-riding and adverse selection96. EPFIs know that they 
potentially gain reputational benefits irrespective of their actual practices. Even EPFIs that do 
not intend to comply gain good publicity from their association with the Equator Principles. 
                                                          
92 Cp. O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer (note 21), 566. 
93 Due to a lack of adequate enforcement, monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms, the Equator Principles seem 
to exist only on paper.   
94  Cp. Wright & Rwabizambuga (note 10), 90; O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer (note 21). 
95  Cp. Conley & Williams (note 43), 564. 
96 “Adverse selection results from corporations joining the collective, gaining the benefits of the collective, while 
at the same time negatively affecting the collective by lowering the standards of the code […]. As the number of 
adoptees increases, the newer members are more likely attracted by the benefits while at the same time 
decreasing the level of compliance. Adverse selection reduces the incentive of strong performers to join or 
remain as members” (Schepers (note 65), 94).  
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They just imitate or mimic the behavior of good EPFIs, while project-affected communities 
suffer from a lack of effectiveness and practical failure of the Equator Principles. In other 
words: Irresponsible institutions might claim benefits of enhanced reputation and a reduced 
threat of government regulations with no intention of actually implementing their new 
commitments.97 Strategic free-riders gain the benefits without bearing the implementation and 
compliance costs. The danger, therefore, comes up of attracting signatories that are not truly 
committed to the ‘Spirit of the Equator Principles’. Free-riding behavior leads to competitive 
disadvantages for adopters, since they have to bear compliance costs while free-riding 
companies do not. Additionally, free-riding negatively affects the collective by lowering the 
standards of the code and by decreasing the level of compliance. In the end, the brand value of 
the Equator Principles diminishes.98  
One proposed solution to overcome the problem of free-riding and adverse selection is to 
introduce entry criteria for the Equator Principles membership and absolute performance 
standards. Moreover, a two-tiered Equator Principles Association membership structure 
reflecting different aspirations would allow EPFIs to voluntarily apply the ‘Spirit of the 
Equator Principles’ to other fields than project finance, thus, moving beyond project finance. 
This European Union-like ‘two speed’ or ‘clubs within the club’-structure would allow EPFIs 
to proactively respond to ethical and environmental issues and meet the demands of multiple 
stakeholder groups. EPFIs would have the strategic opportunity to ‘over-comply’ (Kulkarni), 
to go beyond what is formally/legally and informally required and gain first-mover 
advantages. They might boost their credibility and as a consequence gain (additional) 
reputational capital that directly adds to their brand value. In case that the ‘Spirit of the 
Equator Principles’ is internalized and embedded throughout the whole organization, this 
could also trigger a cultural change within banks and other financial institutions.  
While a tiered membership structure once established would allow EPFIs to voluntarily 
comply with additional and strengthened environmental, social and human rights standards 
that go beyond the IFC Performance Standards, it would at the same time take into 
consideration that some EPFIs are not willing or able to comply with the respective 
strengthened standards (and to bear additional implementation and compliance costs). 
Nevertheless, these EPFIs would still be part of the Equator Principles Association. This, in 
turn, would ensure that at least minimum environmental, social and human rights standards 
are met (given that adequate monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms are established).     
                                                          
97 Cp. Wright & Rwabizambuga (note 10), 91; Macve & Chen (note 11), 895; Schepers (note 65), 93. 
98  Cp. Sarro (note 75), 1532. 
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A tiered membership structure is especially important when considering the rising tension 
between broadening – outreach to BRIC countries – and deepening – further enhancement 
and strengthening of the Principles – the Equator Principles Association-membership 
structure: The decision-making process is already slow and complicated given the conflicting 
views and differing priorities especially between EFPIs from high income OECD countries 
and EPFIs from ‘non-designated countries’ The more EPFIs coming from heterogeneous 
cultural backgrounds and having (partially) conflicting interests adopt the Equator Principles, 
the more difficult consensus-seeking within the Equator Principles Association gets. In 
several occasions, only the lowest common denominator has been found inhibiting the further 
advancement of the Equator Principles in general.   
XII. Business and Human Rights  
The Equator Principles explicitly acknowledge John Ruggie’s Protect, Respect, and Remedy-
Framework which forms the basis of the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights.99 In addition, they acknowledge the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the core conventions of the International Labor Organization, and the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  
Human rights are closely related and interlinked with the inclusion of project-affected 
communities, especially indigenous peoples, but also NGOs, civil society organizations and 
other stakeholder groups. It is the aim of the Equator Principles to establish an ongoing and 
culturally appropriate stakeholder engagement, consultation, and participation process. 
Information has to be made readily and publicly available to the project-affected communities 
in their local languages.100 The disclosure of information should occur as early as possible in 
the assessment process – ideally within the planning stage and before construction 
commences – and on an ongoing basis. Project affected communities have to have the right to 
participate in decision-making. Their voices have to be heard, and the interests and needs of 
                                                          
99 The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights is the first global standard for preventing and 
addressing the risk of adverse impacts on human rights linked to business activities. It encompass three 
principles: 1. “the state duty to protect against human rights abuses committed by third parties, including 
business, through appropriate policies, regulation and adjudication”, 2. “the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights […] acting with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others, and addressing harms that 
do occur” (i.e., companies need a human rights due diligence process, that enables them to be aware of, prevent, 
and address their adverse human rights impacts), and 3. “access by victims to effective remedy […] through 
judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means” (i.e., effective grievance mechanism) (United 
Nations, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011); available at: 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf (accessed 11 July 2013); cp. 
United Nations, The UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework for Business and Human Rights (2011), 
available at: www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Protect-Respect-Remedy-
Framework/GuidingPrinciples (accessed 11 July 2013)).  
100 A huge problem in this regard that has to be tackled is the problem of illiteracy in developing countries.  
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disadvantaged and vulnerable groups have to be taken into consideration. The whole 
stakeholder engagement process should be free from external manipulation, interference, 
coercion and intimidation. Projects with adverse impacts on aboriginal or indigenous peoples 
even require their ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ (FPIC). This consent, however, does 
not create any veto rights nor does it require unanimity. Nevertheless, FPIC aims at reaching a 
consensus and the term consent goes beyond the previously mentioned consultation 
paradigm.101   
The Equator Principles, in theory, go beyond the pure shareholder value approach. They try to 
incorporate multiple stakeholder perspectives including those of project-affected 
communities, NGOs, civil society organizations and other stakeholder groups. A dialogue 
between these groups, EPFIs and their clients is aspired. As such, the Equator Principles are 
ideally a bottom-up approach that enhances democratic and organizational legitimacy. 
Stakeholder dialogue, public discourse and deliberation can be seen here as a source of 
organizational legitimacy.102 The Principles also aim at reframing multinational companies’ 
public identity as corporate citizens (going beyond pure profit-seeking organizations) and to 
adapt to the changing community expectations of corporate responsibilities.103 
The protection of human rights – together with environmental protection and the fight against 
global warming/climate change – is, thus, at the heart of the third generation of the Equator 
Principles. It is remarkable that it took exactly ten years until the term ‘human rights’ was 
introduced into the Equator Principles framework for the first time. Only the latest version of 
the Equator Principles contains direct references to corporate human rights policy and 
corporate human rights due diligence.104 As such, EP III has to be regarded as a major step 
forward compared to EP II with regards to (environmental protection and) human rights.  
                                                          
101 This idea of inclusion (in the sense of Teilhabe and integration) bears some remarkable resemblances to the 
work of the Nobel Prize laureates Amartya Sen and Elinor Ostrom as well as to Kantian philosophy – including 
Kant’s notion of positive freedom, autonomy, human dignity and the Categorical Imperative which demands that 
people are treated as ends in themselves and never merely as means to an end; cp. Amartya Sen, The Idea of 
Justice (2009); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The evolution of institutions for collective actions 
(1990); Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797/2013); Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals (1785/2013); Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (1781/2011). 
102 Haack et al. ((note 10), 33) speak of “legitimation as deliberation” and the “communicative sources of 
legitimation” (see also the work of famous discourse theorists like Habermas et al. as well as Andreas Georg 
Scherer & Guido Palazzo, Toward a Political Conception of Corporate Responsibility – Business and Society 
seen from a Habermasian Perspective, 32 Academy of Management Review, 1096 (2007)).  
103 Cp. Wright & Rwabizambuga (note 10), 92; Andrew (note 40), 302; Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, Corporate 
Citizenship: Towards an extended theoretical conceptualization; 30(1) The Academy of Management Review, 
166-179; Jeremy Moon, Andrew Crane & Dirk Matten, Can Corporations be Citizens? Corporate Citizenship as 
a Metaphor for Business Participation in Society, 15(3) Business Ethics Quarterly, 429 (2005). 
104 Human rights due diligence requires: (1) the development of a human rights policy statements; (2) periodic 
assessment and reports of actual and potential adverse human rights impacts of corporations’ activities and 
(stakeholder) relationships; (3) the integration of commitments and assessments into internal control and 
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However, the current version of the Equator Principles is in great need of improvement: There 
is only one explicit reference to the PRR-framework in a footnote. The term ‘human rights’ is 
mainly mentioned in the preamble and the exhibit; the term ‘human rights due diligence’ is 
mentioned only once and with the addition ‘may be appropriate’, while the terms ‘Human 
Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA)’ and ‘human rights action plan’ are lacking. Furthermore, 
EP III refers only once to gender issues (i.e., women’s rights) – in exhibit II.105  
In particular, Ruggie’s (and the Equator Principles’) “human rights minimalism”106 poses 
serious problems: the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on the issue of 
business and human rights (and the Equator Principles) clearly favor an impact-based concept 
of negative corporate responsibility according to the motto ‘do no harm’, that is avoid causing 
or contributing to human rights violations. Ruggie (and the Equator Principles) reject all 
forms of positive and leverage-based corporate social responsibility.107 States are considered 
to be the primary duty-bearers; according to Ruggie, international human rights laws apply 
only to states, but not to non-state actors such as (transnational) corporations. Thus, any duty 
to protect and realize human rights is part of the exclusive domain of nation-states (i.e., 
nation-state centered perspective). Corporations only need to fulfill the duty to respect human 
rights; exercising leverage to protect and realize human rights is regarded as an optional 
matter, not as a moral obligation.108  
The problem is that Ruggie’s human rights ‘voluntarism’ clashes with the fundamental moral 
nature of human rights. Human rights (including social and economic rights) are moral rights 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
monitoring systems, and; (4) reporting and tracking of human rights performance (cp. Michael Torrance, Human 
Rights, 317 (M. Torrance ed., 2012). 
105 Principles 7 and 9 (on independent review and monitoring) as well as principles 9 and 10 (on reporting) can 
be easily combined, thus creating space for a separate principle solely devoted to human rights issues. This 
principle should then precede all others and serve as an anchoring or guiding principle (cp. BankTrack (note 39), 
11; BankTrack (note 46), 16).    
106 Florian Wettstein, CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great Divide, 22(4) 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 739, 745 (2012).  
107 Cp. Stepan Wood, Four Varieties of Social Responsibility: Making Sense of the “Sphere of Influence” and 
“Leverage” Debate via the Case of ISO 26000, 07(04) Osgoode CLPE Research Paper Series (2011), available 
at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1777505 (accessed 8 October 2013); Stepan Wood, The 
Case for Leverage-Based Corporate Human Rights Responsibility, 22(1) Business Ethics Quarterly, 63 (2012). 
108 Cp. John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and 
Accountability for Corporate Acts. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises; 9 February 2007, 
A/HRC/4/035 (2007), available at: www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/RuggieHRC2007 (accessed 8 
October 2013); John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy. A Framework for Business and Human Rights. 
Report of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 3(2) Innovations: Technology, Governance, 
Globalization, 189 (2008); John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing the “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 22 April 2009, A/HRC/11/13 
(2009), available at: www.refworld.org/docid/49faf98a2.html (accessed 8 October 2013); John Ruggie, Just 
Business. Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (2013).  
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or entitlements which are deeply rooted in human dignity and the moral equality of all human 
beings.109 They are inalienable and universal moral rights which exist a priori and 
independently of nation-states and legal laws. This status of human rights rules out any form 
of moral discretion, arbitrariness and human rights voluntariness. Thus, (transnational) 
corporations have direct moral obligations to unconditionally respect, protect AND realize 
human rights. They are direct duty-bearers – in other words: states are not the exclusive and 
only bearers of positive obligations. Multinational corporations’ moral responsibilities must 
go beyond ‘do no harm’, and they must do more than merely respect human rights. Their 
scope of responsibility includes a positive duty to protect and realize human rights. Due to 
their political role and power (i.e., transnational corporations as political, quasi-governmental 
actors, de facto rule-makers, addressees and authors of regulations110), multinational 
corporations have a positive duty to speak out (i.e., avoidance of corporate complicity defined 
as ‘aiding and abetting’ in human rights violations committed by third parties), a duty to 
protect victims of human rights abuses, a duty to promote human rights-compatible 
institutions in home and host countries, and a duty to foster change or to put pressure on 
oppressive governments.  
The Equator Principles Association is well advised to take the critique of Ruggie’s PRR-
framework serious: What is needed is a push for non-voluntary, mandatory and legally 
binding rules for business in particular with respect to human rights as well as a 
comprehensive impact and leverage-based conception of responsibility (make use of their 
leverage/ organization’s capacity to influence other parties’ decisions and activities, especially 
those which are part of the supply chain) including positive human rights obligations for 
corporations and a corporate human rights advocacy and activism.             
G. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has dealt with the special role of financial institutions as (de facto) “global 
sustainability regulators”111 and standard setters.112 In many cases, they have taken the lead in 
                                                          
109 Cp. Florian Wettstein, Beyond Voluntariness, Beyond CSR: Making a Case for Human Rights and Justice, 
114(1) Business and Society Review, 125 (2009); Florian Wettstein, The Duty to Protect: Corporate Complicity, 
Political Responsibility, and Human Rights Advocacy, 96 Journal of Business Ethics, 33 (2010); Florian 
Wettstein, For Better or For Worse: Corporate Responsibility Beyond “Do No Harm”, 20(2) Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 275 (2010); Florian Wettstein, Silence as Complicity: Elements of a Corporate Duty to Speak Out 
against the Violation of Human Rights, 22(1) Business Ethics Quarterly, 37 (2012); Wettstein (note 106). 
110 Cp. Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility, 413 (A. 
Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon, D. Siegel eds., 2008); Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo & 
Dirk Matten, Introduction to the Special Issue: Globalization as a Challenge for Business Responsibilities, 19(3) 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 327 (2009).  
111 Cp. Conley & Williams (note 43). 
112 “… lenders, owing to their expertise in the project finance sector and their understanding of existing norms on 
managing environmental and social risk […] are relatively well-placed to set effective standards and to 
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fostering CSR and sustainable development especially in politically unstable and/or socially 
and environmentally fragile contexts such as developing countries and emerging markets. By 
introducing developed-country social and environmental standards into developing regions, 
they have adopted the role of quasi-regulators.113  
Banks, insurance companies and the like are key factors in the transition towards a green 
economy. They help to catalyze this process towards economic, ecological and social 
sustainability and CSR by voting with their money.114 During this process, the Equator 
Principles have an important function to fulfill: They (ideally) help to balance economic 
(profit), ecological (planet) and ethical issues (people) (cp. the ‘triple P’ framework). They 
have the potential to equally promote self-interest and the common good: EPFIs and clients 
pursue their own economic (pecuniary) motives115, while the adopted principles make sure 
that environmental, social and human rights standards are met. Furthermore, the Equator 
Principles ideally(!) function as a catalyst for cultural change within banks.116 In order to do 
so, some necessary reform steps have to be adopted:  
According to Jeucken117, four types of banking have to be distinguished: defensive banking 
(“… environmental laws and regulations are thought to be threats to its business. Only curative measures are 
taken. In this vision, care for the environment only adds to costs and there is certainly no money to be earned 
from it”), preventive banking (“… different from the previous phase in that potential costs savings are 
identified. […] A bank does not want to go any further than the environmental laws that exist […] it is somewhat 
passive, limiting external risks and liabilities and saving production costs internally”), offensive banking 
(“Banks see new opportunities in the marketplace, both in the area of specific products and new markets […]. 
The bank is looking for profitable, environmentally sound opportunities in the market, which can compete with 
alternative investment and lending opportunities. The stance can be described as proactive, creative and 
innovative […]. The extra steps are taken whenever there are win-win situations at the micro-level…”), and 
sustainable banking (“… the bank lays down qualitative preconditions so that all its activities are sustainable 
[…] thanks to a consciously chosen policy […] [and] the ambition to operate sustainably in every respect”). 
EPFIs fall either into the preventive or offensive type of banking category where a holistic 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
effectively monitor their borrowers’ conduct. […] [yet] lenders are currently not well-place to enforce the 
[Equator Principles]. Their short-term interest in the completion of the projects they finance impairs their ability 
to credibly threaten to withdraw financing in the face of persistent non-compliance by borrowers” (cp. Sarro 
(note 75), 1524).  
113 Cp. Conley & Williams (note 43). 
114 Cp. Id., 565. 
115 By reducing various forms of economic and non-economic risks, the Equator Principles can also help to make 
a project a more secure investment and a safer loan.  
116 Cp. Conley & Williams (note 43), 546. This changed mind-set and institutional change within EPFIs seems to 
be true at least for the project finance sector. Whether it is true in general (including the investment banking 
sector) remains doubtful as recent financial market crises, the LIBOR scandal and other corporate governance 
scandals have shown.  
117 Jeucken (note 12), 72. 
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and all-encompassing implementation of the ‘Spirit of the Equator Principles’ is still lacking. 
What is required from an economic ethics perspective is the transformation from 
preventive/offensive banking towards sustainable banking. This implies that the ‘Spirit of the 
Equator Principles’ needs to be embedded throughout the whole organization. All levels of 
the organization should internalize the ‘Spirit of the Equator Principles’. Environmental and 
social risk management as well as CSR should ideally be integrated into the company’s core 
businesses. Furthermore, recruitment, outside consultation, staff and front-line training as well 
as awareness and consciousness rising and sensitizing are essential. Of eminent importance is 
the top-level commitment: The CEO and other senior or top-level managers function as role-
models. A change in organizational culture also affects the incentive structures and in 
particular the bonus payment systems or compensation structures/packages that should be 
long- rather than short-term oriented. So far, investment managers are judged according to 
their quarterly or annual performance and not according to their multiple-years 
performance.118    
In order to further strengthen the Equator Principles as a true benchmark for responsible 
investment practices this paper has identified the following necessary reform steps (i.e., top 6 
priorities towards EP IV119):  
1. Introduction of an enforcement pyramid including automatic sanctions like delisting 
and exclusion of non-compliant EPFIs;  
2. Introduction of absolute performance standards, i.e., clear, verifiable metrics that are 
transparently and independently monitored which help to assess environmental and 
social performance of EPFIs and their clients;  
3. Introduction of minimum entry requirements that have to be met prior becoming a 
member of the Equator Principles Association;  
4. Tiered membership structure within the Equator Principles Association that allows to 
bridge the gap between broadening and deepening considerations;  
5. Reform of the Equator Principles Association including enhanced funding and staffing 
and the establishment of an Equator Principles Forum and an Equator Principles 
advisory group, and last not least  
6. Establishment of third-party beneficiary rights for project-affected communities.  
                                                          
118 Cp. Chan (note 90), 1345. 
119 EP III has to be considered as an improvement over EP II (cp. Equator Principles Association, Equator 
Principles (EP II) (2006), available at: http://equator-principles.com/index.php/ep3/ep3 (accessed 11 November 
2013)), but bigger steps must be taken by the EPFIs to further strengthen the Equator Principles. Reform 
measures to fight global warming (climate change) and to fully realize corporate human rights responsibilities 
are important issues. Further fields of necessary reform include the extension of scope, an increase in 
transparency and accountability (see also BankTrack (note 39)).  
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Given that these reform steps are implemented in the near future (which implies a reform of 
the Governance Rules as well), the Equator Principles framework can be seen as the starting 
point of developing hard(er) law through soft law (i.e., hardening of inter-/transnational 
norms).120 The Equator Principles have to be considered as an essential step forward in an 
unregulated and potentially destructive area of doing business, but they require further 
strengthening, especially strengthening of the governance system (i.e., enforcement, 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms).   
                                                          
120 Cp. Conley & Williams (note 43), 565. 
